Free Book Online
A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan


A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan

4.3 (1170)

Log in to rate this item

    Available in PDF Format | A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan.pdf | Unknown
    Dov S. Zakheim
"As someone who has spent half his professional life in the world of policy and the other half in the world of programs and budgets, I saw unfold before my eyes ?to my regret ?strong evidence that the twain still do not meet. This book is therefore an attempt to explain specifically why the system didn't work for Afghanistan, and still may fail." ?from the IntroductionThe Vulcans were a group of eight people who advised George W. Bush's campaign on foreign affairs and subsequently helped shape and implement his administration's foreign policy as it responded to September 11 and launched military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Included in the group was Dov Zakheim, comptroller and chief financial officer of the Department of Defense and, starting in 2002, also DoD's coordinator for Afghan civilian reconstruction. A Vulcan's Tale is the inside story of how the Bush administration missed opportunities and struggled to manage two wars, particularly the seemingly endless conflict in Afghanistan, written by a man who was present at its inception.The Bush administration's results in Afghanistan were partly due to the enormity of the challenges, certainly, but flawed leadership and deficiencies of management, understanding, and forethought all played their part as well. "And nowhere, in [Zakheim's] estimation, did these deficiencies and flaws accumulate to do more damage than in the case of the war in Afghanistan." In A Vulcan's Tale, the "money man" for national security shows how the devil was in the details. Effective coordination and leadership were too often missing, and funding often inadequate. Turf wars between the State and Defense departments made effective coordination difficult. And the power of the purse proved decisive, as it so often does: The Office of Management and Budget, in Zakheim's view, inadequately funded State Department and USAID efforts in Afghanistan early in the war. The die was cast for several more years of conflict, with no end in sight. It didn't have to be this way.   show more
3.5 (6123)
  • Pdf

*An electronic version of a printed book that can be read on a computer or handheld device designed specifically for this purpose.

Formats for this Ebook

Required Software Any PDF Reader, Apple Preview
Supported Devices Windows PC/PocketPC, Mac OS, Linux OS, Apple iPhone/iPod Touch.
# of Devices Unlimited
Flowing Text / Pages Pages
Printable? Yes

Book details

  • PDF | 320 pages
  • Dov S. Zakheim
  • Brookings Institution Press
  • Unknown
  • 4
  • History

Review Text

The message text: